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In Word and Object, Quine sets forth and defends the thesis of the 
indeterminacy of translation. 1 The indeterminacy thesis is designed to 
reveal the empirical emptiness of the pre-critical notion of meaning. Quine 
also believes himself to have exposed (though, strictly speaking, not argued 
for) the shortcomings of the pre-critical notion of meaning 2 by subjecting it 
to the empirical, behavioristic spotlight of radical translation. If Quine is 
correct, if radical translation is impossible, then the indeterminacy thesis 
must therefore be accepted as a consequence. Moreover, once such 
indeterminacy and the consequences which accompany it are fully 
appreciated, our widespread, common-sense notions of meaning and 
sameness of meaning must be discarded. 
Quine's indeterminacy thesis has been the target of much criticism. 3 Yet 
many of these criticism are the result of misunderstanding (or perhaps 
simply missing the point of) Quine's work. Jerrold Katz is one such critic 
who claims to refute Quine's thesis. In his recent article, 'The Refutation of 
Indeterminacy," Katz ventures to say that if he is correct, "there is a 
straightforward sense in which the indeterminacy thesis is refuted." 4 
I will attempt to show that Katz is not correct, the refutation he 
proposes is neither straightforward nor a successful refutation of Quine's 
indeterminacy thesis. Thus, I contend that Quine's indeterminacy thesis can 
easily withstand Katz's alleged refutation. This paper will consist of two 
main sections, the first of which will outline Quine's indeterminacy thesis 
and provide concomitant arguments, while the second section will evaluate 
Katz's proposed refutation of the indeterminacy thesis. The former section is 
intended to serve as a basis for evaluating Katz's charges against Quine. In 
the latter section 1 will point out precisely where and why Katz's alleged 
refutation fails. 
1 W.V.W. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960). 
2 The traditional, or precritical notion of meaning to which I refer is one of 
fixed, unique meanings to which particular thoughts or sentences are 
believed to correspond. In short, these meanings are intensional entities 
which are thought to get captured (represented, expressed, etc.) by sentences 
or terms. 
-1 For example, see D. Davidson and J. Hintikka (eds.), Words and Objections: 
Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1968). 
4 J. J. Katz, "The Refutation of Indeterminacy," The Journal of Philosophy, 
LXXXV,5(May 1988): 228. 
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1. The Indeterminacy Thesis and Supporting Arguments5 
In Word and Object we find the early formulation of the indeterminacy 
thesis, as well as the famous experiment of radical translation. There Quine 
first argues for the thesis, 6 although as Quine himself will later remark, this 
argument proves to be neither the strongest nor the preferred argument. It is 
in later writings, namely, "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation," 
"Indeterminacy of Translation Again," "Epistemology Naturalized," as well 
as responses provide to essays in Words and Objections, that we find different, 
refined (and often clearer) argumentation for the indeterminacy thesis. 7 We 
will now consider that early formulation of the indeterminacy thesis found 
in Word and Object as well as the accompanying argument which 
(mistakenly) received much attention as the main argument for the thesis. 
Quine's later arguments will then be put forth in an effort to both clarify the 
thesis and locate the strongest argument in support of it. 
In Chapter 2 of Word and Object, Quine reveals his project, to "consider 
how much of language can be made sense of in terms of its stimulus 
conditions, and what scope this leaves for empirically unconditioned 
variation in one's scheme." 8 In other words, Quine wants to see just how 
much sense can be made of meanings (or sameness of meaning) within the 
limited realm of empirically conditioned (caused) stimulus responses, and if 
any sense can be made of meanings existing beyond this scope. He goes on 
to provide the following formulation of the indeterminacy thesis which is 
illustrated by attempting radical translation:9 
. . . manuals for translating one language into another can 
be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the 
totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one 
another. In countless places they will diverge in giving, as 
5 For the Sake of brevity 1 will provide only quotes which bear on the most 
immediate issues—explication and/or defense of the indeterminacy thesis, 
and assume the reader is otherwise familiar with Quine's writing. 
6 Word and Object, section 15. 
7 W.V. Quine, "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translatum," The journal 
of Philosophy, 1970, pp. 178-183, "Indeterminacy of Translation Again," The 
journal of Philosophy, 1987, pp. 5-10, "Epistemology Naturalized," in 
Onlological Relativity and Other Essays, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1969), pp. 69-90. 
Davidson, Donald, and Hintikka, Jaakko, eds., Words and Objections: Essays 
on the Work of W. V. Quine, (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1969). 
8 Word and Object, p. 26. 
9 Quine would later describe radical translation as a "thought experiment" 
designed to show that, "there is nothing to linguistic meaning . . . beyond 
what is to be gleaned from observable circumstances." "Indeterminacy of 
Translation Again," p. 5. 
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their respective translations of a sentence of the one 
language, sentences of the other language which stand to 
each other in no sort of plausible equivalence, however, 
loose. The firmer the direct links of a sentence with non-
verbal stimulation, of course, the less drastically its 
translation can diverge from one another from manual to 
manual. 1 0 
We learn that the thrust of the thesis lies in the possibility (or perhaps the 
inescapability) of generating divergent translation manuals which are 
constructed from, hence compatible with, the very sam evidence (verifiable 
speech dispositions). The degree of indeterminacy is a function of the 
sentence's (or term's) link to non-verbal stimulation; in Quine's terms, 
observation sentences will not suffer from much indeterminacy, while 
standing sentences suffer greatly. 
The upshot of the thesis is that the common conception of meanings as 
unique and determinate entities is shattered; there are no such unique, fixed 
entities according to Quine, for their identity conditions cannot be 
established. That is, the very same behavior is evidence of more than one 
meaning; the evidence does not suffice to fix the conditions under which a 
particular meaning is said to be present or expressed. Of course, if there are 
no such fixed meanings, then it will make no sense to speak of sameness of 
meaning either, for there are no objective meanings for terms or sentences to 
share. 
The remainder of Chapter 2 is primarily devoted to drawing out the 
indeterminacy thesis by utilizing radical translation. It is here that Quine 
provides his first argument for the indeterminacy thesis. The argument 
relies upon analytical hypotheses, 1 1 as well as what Quine later refers to as 
the inscrutability of reference. Quine writes: 
. . . stimulus meaning was incapable of deciding among 
'rabbit,' 'rabbit stage,' and various other terms as 
translations of "gavagai" . . . [two different] analytical 
hypotheses may be presumed possible. Both could 
doubtless be accommodated by compensatory variations 
in analytical hypotheses concerning other locutions, so as 
to conform equally to all independently discoverable 
translations of while sentences and indeed all speech of all 
speakers concerned. And yet countless native sentences 
admitting no independent check . . . may be expected to 
w Word and Object, p. 27. 
1 1 Basically, these hypotheses equate (hypothetically) an English term or 
phrase with a Jungle term or phrase. Analytical hypotheses are supposed to 
enable the translator to progress, albeit tentatively, with her project of 
radical translation. 
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receive radically unlike and incompatible English 
renderings under the two systems. 1 2 
It seems the argument here is intended to show that the epistemic evidence 
is such that it will equally support analytical hypotheses which translate the 
term 'gavagai' into quite different (or perhaps even contradictory) English 
terms or phrases (e.g. 'rabbit stage,' 'undetached rabbit par t ' ) . 1 3 Moreover, 
the argument goes, the indeterminacy at the level of terms will promote 
indeterminacy on the level of sentences as well. 
The obvious weakness in this argument is the vagueness surrounding 
the relationship between inscrutability of reference (which applies only to 
terms) and the indeterminacy of translation (which applies only to 
sentences) . 1 4 Quine later makes it quite clear that while inscrutability of 
reference may entail indeterminacy, this is not always the c a s e . 1 5 He states 
that; 
[t]he gavagai example had only [an] indirect bearing on 
indeterminacy of translation of sentences: one could 
imagine with some plausibility [that inscrutability of terms 
will carry with it indeterminacy of sentences] . . . this 
whole effort was aimed not at a proof but at helping the 
reader to reconcile the indeterminacy of translation 
imaginatively with the concrete reality of radical 
translation. The argument for the indeterminacy is 
another thing, as seen earlier in this paper. 1 6 
Thus Quine admits that the foregoing argument was not intended to serve 
primarily as an argument, but rather as a device to facilitate understanding 
the thesis; instead he endorses another argument presented earlier in "On 
1 2 Word an Object, pp. 71-72. 
1 3 And to make the point of the thesis more dramatically, the evidence will 
never support just one unique translation, it will always leave translation 
indeterminate. 
1 4 See, "Indeterminacy of Translation Again," pp. 8-9. 
1 5 "A clear example [of inscrutability of reference] was seen in connection 
with the Japanese classifiers [Ontological Relativity and Oilier Essays, pp. 35ff.] 
This example makes it pretty clear, moreover, that the inscrutability of terms 
need not always bring indeterminacy of sentence translation in its train." 
"On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation," p. 182. Here Quine also 
comes to refer to this method of arguing from inscrutability to 
indeterminacy as "pressing from below," p. 183. 
1 6 Ibid., p. 182, and 178, where Quine writes, "My gavagai example has 
figured too centrally in discussions of the indeterminacy of translation. 
Readers [mistakenly] see the example as the ground of the doctrine." 
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the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation." Let us consider this second 
argument. 
While the previous argument was coined "pressing from below," the 
current argument came to be known as "pressing from above," the Quine 
considers it to be "very different, broader and deeper" than the former 
a r g u m e n t . 1 7 This method of arguing for the indeterminacy thesis relies 
upon the undetermination of physical science. Yet Quine goes out of his 
way to make it clear that indeterminacy is not merely a special case of 
underdetermination of physical theory; rather, indeterminacy is a point in 
addition to undetermination. 1 8 Quine maintains that there is only a limited 
parallel between the underdetermination and indeterminacy, and writes: 
Thus, adopt for now my fully realistic attitude . . . falling 
in with the current theory of the world despite knowing 
that it is in principle methodologically under-determined. 
Consider, from this realistic point of view, the totality of 
truths, known and unknown, observable and 
unobservable, past and future. The point about 
indeterminacy of translation is that withstands even all this 
truth, where indeterminacy of translation applies there is 
no real question of right choice; there is no fact of the 
matter even to within the acknowledged under-
determination of a theory of nature. 1 9 
So by appreciating both the underdetermination of physical theory and the 
fact that such theory is (to use Quine's words) the ultimate parameter for any 
attempts at radical translation, we come to realize that indeterminacy is 
suffered over and above underdetermination. 
Quine emphasizes that there is a point at which deciding between 
competing translations, that is, deciding whether to attribute translation A or 
translation B to the native becomes, "a question whose very significance [hej 
would put in doubt." 2 0 We are now at the crux of the argument. Questions 
of meaning which seek a unique answer are misguided according to Quine, 
for there is, strictly speaking, nothing to be right or wrong about. If the 
empirical evidence does not favor one translation over another, then the two 
are equally plausible translations, even if they diverge radically in their 
assignments. There is nothing to which we may appeal beyond the 
empirical evidence. Moreover, this should not be understood as an 
epistemological point, but an ontological one. It is not a question of having 
enough information or evidence upon which to base our decision in. 
'7 Ibid., p. 178. 
I K Ibid., p. 180, see also the reply to Chomsky in Words and Objections, pp. 
302-304. 
1 9 Words and Objections, p. 303, first emphasis is mine. 
2 0 "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation," p. 181. 
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translation, but rather that even once all the facts are in, there is simply 
nothing to be right or wrong about. 
Let us consider a third and final argument for the indeterminacy thesis. 
This argument is located in "Epistemology Naturalized" and is generated out 
of combining Quine's verificationism and holism. Edward Becker provides a 
thorough synopsis of the argument he believes Quine to currently favor: 
. . . a sentence is supposed to be synonymous with its 
translation. If following Peirce we adopt the verificationist 
theory of meaning, synonymy, sameness of meaning, will 
be sameness of confirming and disaffirming experiences. 
But it, following Duhem, we adopt a holistic view of 
confirmation, it will turn out that individual theoretical 
sentences do not have their own confirming and 
disconfirming experiences. Consequently, the notion of 
synonymy will not make sense in application to such 
sentences and it therefore will not make sense, a fortiori, to 
speak of a uniquely correct translation of such sentences. 
In this sense, their translation will be indeterminate. 2 1 
Thus, it appears that indeterminacy is the natural outcome of adopting both 
a verificationist theory of meaning and a holistic view of confirmation. 
Having somewhat briefly surveyed Quine's indeterminacy thesis and 
the supporting arguments, let us turn to Katz's proposed refutation of the 
thesis. 
2 Katz's Refutation of the Indeterminacy Thesis 
Katz's argument against the indeterminacy thesis garners plausibility 
from three primary assumptions: (i) that Quine's argument for the thesis is 
based or depends upon the inscrutability of reference, such as witnessed in 
the 'gavagai' example, (ii) that the distinction between actual translation and 
radical translation is a significant one, and (iii) that linguistically neutral 
meanings are the 'missing link' which, when resurrected, leave one free to 
pursue the parallel between translation and science (hence leave translation 
no worse off than a case of under-determination). 2 2 I suggest that these 
assumptions are mistaken, and it is in virtue of being so mistaken that Katz's 
argument fails as a refutation of Quine's thesis. 1 will now consider these 
assumptions in turn, explaining why I believe them to be erroneous. 
2 1 Becker, Edward. Unpublished manuscript Chapter 3, section 3. 
2 2 Katz provides his reconstruction of Quine's argument on pp. 237-238, and 
first refers tot he argument in "Two dogmas" as the 'missing' argument on p. 
238. 
ON KATZ AND INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION 139 
Assumption (i) 
We recall from section 1 above that it is not necessarily the case that 
every instance of inscrutability of reference brings with it indeterminacy of 
translation. Moreover, we saw that Quine himself has all but abandoned 
"pressing from below," and has gone on to endorse two more powerful 
arguments which do not rely in any way upon inscrutability. This being the 
case, the indeterminacy thesis must be understood as independent of 
arguments generated from the inscrutability of terms. Yet Katz reconstructs 
Quine's argument as one which hinges upon the indeterminacy present in 
reference. Katz writes: 
Although nothing near a proof ["pressing from below"], 
the argument exhibits an unbreakable symmetry among 
the evidential considerations that can be adduced to justify 
various translations. . . [t]he reason is that the ostensive 
acts of the field linguist and the informant cannot refer to a 
rabbit without referring to a rabbit stage or undetached 
rabbit part, nor any of these without the others, and 
radical translation contains nothing that enables the 
linguist to impose controls on hypotheses which enable 
them to choose between extensionally equivalent 
translation options, thus, the argument leave us with not 
grounds on which to resist its conclusion. 2 3 
Thus Katz believes the reason that various translations can be justified given 
the evidence is twofold: reference is inscrutable, and radial translation 
contains nothing that would enable the translator to impose controls on the 
hypotheses, hence reach a decisively better or correct translation. The latter 
point will be discussed shortly in terms of assumption (iii). It should now be 
obvious that linking inscrutability in some necessary fashion with 
indeterminacy is a mistake. Katz has neglected to address Quine's later, 
more powerful arguments for indeterminacy. 
Assumption (ii) 
Katz is convinced that actual translation is significantly different than 
radical translation, and that this difference effects Quine's argument, Katz 
writes: 
I concede that there is no doubt about Quine's conclusion 
if restricted to radical translation. But it is not clear how 
actual translation, to which Quine's conclusion must apply 
if indeterminacy is to matter philosophically, is related to 
2 3 'The Refutation of Indeterminacy," p. 231. 
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radical translation. Thus . . . there can be doubts about the 
step in Quine's argument from his account of radical 
translation to his conclusion as applied to actual 
translation . . . (t]he acceptability of an identification 
depends on whether actual translation is in all relevant 
respects like radical translation. 2 4 
Katz goes on to say that surely one relevant respect in which radical and 
actual translation must be similar is the absence of "independent controls" 
which would allow the translator to get past the evidential symmetry, thus 
eliminating indeterminacy of translation as well. 
There are two reasons why Katz's point is misguided. First, Katz 
overstates the importance of the distinction between radical and actual 
translation. Katz accepts Quine's behaviorist approach as, "a behaviorism 
one can live with." 2 5 This behaviorism is really all that need be assumed to 
produce the philosophically interesting conclusion. Radical translation is 
simply an experiment whereby behavior (which Katz agrees with Quine is) 
relevant to meaning is highlighted. In "indeterminacy of Translation Again," 
Quine portrays radical translation as thought experiment in which, "our only 
data are native utterances and their concurrent observable circumstances." 2 6 
Thus, for Katz to attack the distinction between radical and actual 
translation, it seems he would also need to criticize Quine's apparently 
innocuous behaviorist approach. 
The second reason Katz's point concerning the distinction between 
radical and actual translation is mistaken pertains to the existence of 
independent controls which would facilitate deciding between competing 
analytical hypotheses. Katz claims that a relevant distinction between 
radical and actual translation which Quine neglects is that of the existence of 
such independent controls in actual, but not in radical, translation; "it is the 
absence of such controls which causes evidential symmetry and 
indeterminacy." Furthermore, Katz believes the existence of such controls is 
in turn wholly dependent upon the existence of linguistically neutral 
meanings. Thus, Katz reasons, if we can establish the existence of 
linguistically neutral meanings, we will then have grounds for imposing 
independent controls upon competing analytical hypothesis, triumphantly 
break the evidential symmetry, and topple the indeterminacy thesis. The 
path will then be clear to pursue the parallel between translation and science 
(that is, translation will simply be another case of underdetermination). 
This relates to assumption (iii) above which I initially mentioned as one 
of Katz's crucial assumptions. But first let us dispense with the question of 
whether or not Katz is correct in necessarily linking the existence of 
independent controls to the existence of linguistically neutral meanings. 
2 4 Ibid., pp. 232-233, his emphasis. 
2 5 Ibid., p. 231. 
2 6 Indeterminacy of Translation Again," p. 5. 
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Surely he is not correct. For one can obviously impose any independent 
controls one wishes, without implying or requiring the existence of any 
particular entities; the controls simply serve as an objective criterion 
according to which one may designate particular terms or sentences as, say 
synonymous. This does not, however, mean that there must be some 
objective entities according to which these controls coincide. In other words, 
establishment of independent controls is a separate matter from 
establishment of the identify conditions for objectively existing meanings. 
Thus, the necessary connection between independent controls and 
linguistically neutral meanings reflects a highly dubious step in Katz's 
argument. 2 7 
Assumption (iii) 
Finally, after seeing that Katz has mistakenly backed the question of the 
existence of independent controls up to that existence of linguistically 
neutral meanings, we reach assumption (iii): that linguistically neutral 
meanings represent the 'missing link' in Quine's argument for the 
indeterminacy thesis and, if resurrected, will insure the existence of 
independent controls, which, in turn, enable us to break the evidential 
symmetry, and overcome indeterminacy intranslation. But this premise is 
absurd. For in addition to the point just made that linguistically natural 
meanings are not necessarily linked with independent controls, to begin the 
refutation with a quest for linguistically neutral meanings reflects Katz's 
attribution of a viciously circular (not to mention inaccurate) argument to 
Quine. 
Katz would have us look back to "Two Dogmas Of Empiricism" 2 8 to 
locate the foundation of Quine's argument for indeterminacy. If, as Katz 
insists, Quine had annihilated meanings in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism," 
and if this argument was later intended to serve as the basis of the argument 
for indeterminacy, the Quine is involved in a blatant and inescapable circle 
of reasoning. Here, quite simply, is why: the majority goal or consequence of 
the indeterminacy thesis is proclaimed by Quine to be the, "challenge of an 
ill-conceived notion within traditional semantics, namely, sameness of 
meaning." Clearly, if Quine's objective is to undermine the traditional, 
uncritical notions of meaning and sameness of meaning, then it would be on 
pain of circularity that we would attribute the annihilation of meanings as 
the starting point of Quine's argument for indeterminacy. 
I suggest, against Katz, that "Two Dogmas" was merely an earlier 
attempt (if from a different angle), to question the sense of the traditional 
notions of meaning and sameness of meaning. Thus, we should view both 
2 7 Katz is thus incorrect in stating that the, "reason for thinking independent 
controls do not exist in translation is only as good as the reason Quine has 
for saying that there are no linguistically neutral meanings," p. 234. 
2 8 W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard, 1953). 
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'Two Dogmas" and the subsequent indeterminacy arguments as attempts at 
the very same goal, namely, "to change the prevalent attitudes toward 
meaning, idea, proposition. And in the main the sad fact is . . . [this] escapes 
recognition precisely because of the uncritical persistence of old notions of 
meaning, idea, proposition." 2 9 A sad fact indeed. 
2 9 Words and Objections, p. 304. 
